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Abstract 
Retail employees are the prototypical vulnerable, low-paid employees, and for that reason 
unionism and its benefits, such as collective bargaining, provide important social protection. 
However, the reasons that make employees vulnerable also reduce union power though that is 
not to say that retail unions lack agency. This article analyses the power resources and their 
deployment in the respective retail unions in Australia and New Zealand. The two unions’ 
strategies are quite different, and provide interesting contrasts in approaches and ideology. 
The implications for theory are that ideology matters with respect to union strategy (and 
should be attended to more thoroughly in studies of union renewal) and – as others have also 
argued – the wider institutional context has a very significant influence on outcomes for 
unions and their members. The implication for practice, therefore, is that both workplace and 
extra-workplace strategies in the political and other arenas remain central for the low-paid. 
  
Introduction 
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Industrial relations (IR) and unionism in retail are neglected areas of academic research in 
Australia, as they are worldwide (Tilly and Carré, 2011). In particular, the issue of retail 
union power has not been explicitly addressed in the academic literature, despite the 
likelihood that it is highly constrained, given the demographics and job characteristics of 
retail employees, the nature of the industry and, as Dølvik and Waddington (2004: 31) point 
out, ‘the deregulated and decentralized nature of employment’ in the services sector world-
wide. In this paper, we contribute to the comparative literature on trade unions by analysing 
the strategy of retail unions in two countries using the lens of union power. The unions in 
Australia and NZ are, respectively, the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association 
(SDA), and FIRST Union (the National Distribution Union [NDU] until a 2011 union 
merger). 
 
Comparative research is useful in that it produces dynamic and contextualised understandings 
(Hyman, 2001; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Baccaro, Hamann and Turner, 2003) in order to 
advance IR knowledge. Further, comparing a single industry in two countries with similar 
historical patterns of IR development allows for a focus on issues other than national culture, 
giving more analytical depth than a one-country study (Kaine and Ravenswood, 2013). 
Australia and NZ have strong potential for comparative research because of similarities in 
regulatory and cultural environments (Markey, 2011) as neighbouring Pacific economies, 
although there are also marked differences. 
 
Our research questions are three-fold: What are the two unions’ strategies with respect to 
bargaining and campaigning, and relationships with employers? What are the outcomes in 
terms of benefits for members? And within a comparative framework that foregrounds the 
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nature of union power, how are strategies and outcomes to be understood? The overall 
contribution of this research is in demonstrating that, in the wider context of low-paid and 
unstable employment in retail, and the resultant shifting of risk to employees, the degree of 
employees’ relative power and control is all-important (Kalleberg, 2009). We show that while 
the unions can take very different strategic paths, power, and how it is deployed, is important 
and institutional environments are still a major factor affecting outcomes, with implications 
for both theory and practice. 
 
The paper is organised so that the first section examines the international literature on retail 
trade unionism, and overviews that on union power. The second section backgrounds the 
retail industry and the politico-industrial contexts in comparing the two countries. In the third 
section, we report our findings on the similarities and differences in union strategy and 
outcomes. Analytical tools from the literature on power are used to examine these findings in 
the fourth section, paying particular attention to issues of union ideology and outcomes such 
as collective bargaining coverage, relative wages and union density.  
 
Retail Union Research and the Power Vacuum 
 
While there is a developing body of literature on retail unionism, studies fail to grapple with 
the nature of union power in the industry. However, recent developments in this area provide 
a conceptual framework to analyse retail union power. 
 
Retail Union Literature 
Retail employees form about 10 per cent of the workforce in most post-industrial economies, 
and are the paradigmatic low-paid workforce (Carré, Tilly, van Klavereen and Voss-Dahm, 
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2010). Studies of retail union strategy have been undertaken in the US and Canada (Coulter, 
2013; Ikeler, 2011; Phillips, 2012), the UK (Parker and Rees, 2013), Europe (Dribbusch, 
2005; Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009; Geppert, Williams, Wortmann, Czarzasty, Kağniciolğlu, 
Köhler, Royle, Rückert and Uçkan, 2014; Mrozowicki, 2014; Mrozowicki, Roosalu and Senčar, 
2013), China (He and Xie, 2011) and Central America (Tilly and Galván [2006] with respect 
to Mexico). There is some literature on Australian retail unionism (Lynch, Price, Pyman and 
Bailey, 2011; Balnave and Mortimer, 2005; Mortimer 2001a, 2001b; Price, Bailey and 
Pyman, 2014) but none available on NZ. Comparative studies on retail unions in other 
countries are starting to emerge (Geppert et al., 2014; Mrozowicki, 2014; Mrozowicki et al., 
2013). While extant work is wide-ranging and useful, much of it implicitly recognising the 
limitations of union power in retail, this paper makes a unique contribution by explicitly 
examining the power of two retail trade unions in a comparative context.  
 
Conceptual Approaches to Union Power  
Pocock (2000: 2) observed some time ago that ‘agreement on a comprehensive detailed 
theoretical model of union power does not exist’ despite the importance of considerations of 
power to union renewal. Since Pocock’s observation, there have been several developments. 
Two are key for our analysis. The first is Kelly (2011), who takes a broad-brush, fully 
contextualised approach, highlighting five domains of union power. Three – markets, 
institutions and the labour process – are largely ‘external’ to unions. Two – union resources 
and mobilisation capacity – are largely internal and thus areas where union choices can make 
more of a direct difference. The second approach is the work of Levesque, Murray and 
colleagues who unpack Kelly’s concepts of ‘union resources’ and ‘mobilisation capacity’ in 
order to place the focus on union agency and explain how resources and mobilisation capacity 
are used. According to Levesque and Murray (2010), union power resources comprise the 
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quartet of: internal solidarity, network embeddedness (or external solidarity), narrative 
resources (which frame union understandings and actions), and infrastructural resources 
(material and human). Yet resources are insufficient, on their own, to exert power. Hence, 
Levesque and Murray (2010, citing Ganz, 2000) offer the notion of strategic capabilities or 
‘resourcefulness’: the capacity and willingness of an actor to put power resources to work. 
Capability comprises: intermediating (including activating social networks, and both cross-
border and localised alliances); framing (putting forward an agenda that may be used to 
justify new practices and mobilise members and others); articulating (of different levels of 
action over time and space); and learning (the capacity to learn from change to alter future 
events, rather than remaining ‘a prisoner of [one’s] own history’ (Levesque and Murray, 
2010: 344). Figure 1 summarises the two approaches which guide our analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Union Power (adapted from Levesque and Murray, 2010) 
 
Union Power in Retail 
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The nature of the retail workforce (largely young, feminized and part-time, with high reliance 
on contingent labour) and the industry (often high volume but low profit margins, and 
increasingly governed by national and multinational chains) suggests that retail unions will 
face challenges; but how do they attempt to exert power in the employment relationship? In 
this article, we argue that it is only by combining the two approaches – the broader context 
emphasised by Kelly (2011), and the internal choices of unions unpacked by Levesque and 
Murray (2010) – that a rounded picture of union power is made possible. Union power 
concerns the costs and sanctions that their members can impose on management, including 
disruptions of service, the scarcity value of employees and their skills, and employees’ 
political influence (Batstone, 1988: 223); beyond the workplace, the role of the state is 
important (ibid, 224). We argue that union ideology and the wider political context play a key 
factor in how power is operationalised, in line with Simms’ (2012) contention that we need to 
understand how various union strategies are politicised (or not) when we examine union 
strategy, and other scholars’ work, including classic IR scholars like Dunlop (1958). Ideology 
underpins choices about the use of resources, alliances and mechanisms for framing the union 
message. The comparative element of our paper brings into sharp relief how those aspects 
interact. As we will demonstrate, these two unions present a distinctive contrast in ideology. 
However, our research shows that, as interesting as the two unions’ differences in ideology 
are, and that these differences shape strategy, ‘institutions matter’, and matter greatly.  
 
 
Retail Unions and their Environment in Australia and NZ 
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The retail unions in Australia and NZ present considerable contrasts. The SDA is an ‘industry 
union’, focused almost entirely on retail,1 and is currently Australia’s largest union with 
230,000 members (Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association, 2014). FIRST 
Union however is a general union with 29,000 members, of whom 12,000 are in retail 
(FIRST Union, 2014; Union membership Report). 2  The membership stronghold of both 
unions is in supermarkets (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013; FIRST Union, 2014). This 
sub-sector is highly monopolistic. In NZ, Woolworths Australia, operating mainly under the 
Countdown Brand, has 40 per cent of the market, with Foodstuffs (operating under New 
World, Pak’n’Save and other brands) having the rest (New Zealand Herald, 2012). In 
Australia, retailers Coles and Woolworths dominate the supermarket sector with nearly three-
quarters of the market (Roy Morgan Research, 2014). However, Pak’n’Save is a heavily 
franchised operation, meaning that FIRST Union has to conclude many agreements. In both 
countries the retail labour force is feminised, youthful and part-time, but engages in much 
more casual work in Australia than in NZ (Australian Workforce and Productivity Agency, 
2014: 39-40; Statistics NZ, 2013). 
 
The broader IR context provides some interesting comparisons and contrasts. Australia and 
NZ have historically been characterised as “wage earners’ welfare states” (Castles, 1985) 
with relatively high minimum wages and, until the early 1990s, similar IR legislation 
(Wilson, Spies-Butcher, Stebbing and St John, 2013). However, in NZ, the trend to neo-
liberalism began earlier and was more radical, leading to marked differences in the two 
countries’ contemporary IR systems (Barry and Wailes, 2004) such that, while union power 
has diminished somewhat in Australia (Peetz and Bailey, 2012), NZ unions’ power is 
considerably lower than it was before the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (McAndrew, 
                                                            
1 It also has membership in fast food. 
2 Other FIRST Union coverage is in transport and logistics, wood, textiles/clothing/laundry/baking and, since 
2011, banking, insurance and finance. 
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Edgar and Geare, 2011). Both countries have single-employer bargaining, but NZ now has no 
underpinning system similar to Australia’s industry-focussed ‘modern awards’, which are of 
particular significance for low-paid Australian employees (and their unions) as a safety net 
for collective bargaining. Further, Australia’s compulsory arbitration system continues 
(although attenuated) and, following reforms under the Fair Work Act 2009, now explicitly 
fosters (single-employer) collective bargaining (Creighton, 2011; Waring, Lewer and 
Burgess, 2008). For these and other reasons, collective bargaining coverage across the 
workforce is much higher in Australia than in NZ (42 versus 13 per cent) (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2013; Blumenfeld, Ryall and Kiely, 2011). However, industrial action in 
Australia is more highly constrained legislatively (McCrystal, 2009) than in NZ (Waring et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, both countries’ labour movements – including their retail unions – 
have suffered membership decline in the past generation, from around 40 per cent a 
generation ago to 20.1 per cent in NZ and 18.0 per cent in Australia (Companies Office [NZ], 
2013; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Unions in both Australia and NZ, like those in 
other Anglophone countries (Gall and Fiorito, 2012), are highly concerned about this decline, 
focussing on a range of revitalisation strategies, including more effective organising and 
alliance-building (Parker, 2011; Peetz and Bailey, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
Research Method  
 
To explore the strategic choices of the two unions using the lens of union power, we draw 
upon semi-structured interviews with union officials and organisers. The data that these 
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interviews produced form part of a larger international, comparative study of union strategy 
in the retail industry in Australia, NZ and the UK. The method chosen responds to views that 
the little research that truly evaluates union strategies across nations is generally at the 
broader level of the union movement rather than about particular unions (Baccaro, Hamann 
and Turner, 2003; Bamber and Lansbury, 2011; Frege and Kelly, 2003 Hyman, 2001). In-
depth, qualitative comparative analysis of union strategy is sparse, with extant research 
tending to focus on quantitative variables such as union density or industrial action, or on 
explanations of different union structures and types (Hyman, 2001). 
 
In this article, we report only on the Australian and NZ data. In Australia, interviews and 
focus groups were held with a total of 12 SDA officials and 19 SDA organisers, at different 
levels and in various geographical locations, from 2009–2012. Some SDA state branches 
requested we hold focus groups rather than interviews with organisers, which undoubtedly 
placed some constraints on interviewees; capacity to express opinions that diverged from 
union policy. In NZ, interviews were conducted in 2011 with two officials and five organisers 
from two of the three regional areas of FIRST Union. In contrast to the SDA, FIRST Union 
officials actively co-operated with individual interviews, with the retail secretary admitting 
there would be divergences of opinion, often from younger and newer organisers. All 
interviews and focus groups discussions were digitally recorded and transcribed. The data 
were coded using NVivo, based on key themes that emerged from the interviews/discussions 
and the extant literature. 
 
In the sections that follow, we highlight two key areas of union operation: bargaining and 
campaigning, and relationships with employers. We also highlight the sharp contrast in the 
unions’ ideologies which underpin their activities.  
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FIRST Union and the SDA Compared 
 
Key elements of union strategy are bargaining and campaigning (including organising 
strategies) and relationships with employers. An area of interest that emerged from the data 
was union ideology. In any consideration of union power, it is also necessary to evaluate 
outcomes. These issues are canvassed in this section. 
 
Bargaining and campaigning 
The two unions diverge markedly in their bargaining and campaigning strategies. FIRST 
Union unequivocally calls itself a ‘campaigning union’, whereas the SDA pursues a 
traditional ‘business unionism’ approach identified in previous studies (Balnave and 
Mortimer, 2005; Mortimer 2001a, 2001b). FIRST Union invariably campaigns vigorously, 
recruiting then bargaining, although it chooses targets carefully and does not campaign across 
the board all of the time. For instance, a significant achievement was winning access to The 
Warehouse, NZ’s largest department store retailer, in 2010. The union had to attract and 
organise employees who had joined the company-established ‘Warehouse People’s Union’, 
and then negotiate a collective employment agreement with the employer (FIRST Union 
retail secretary, 2011). In the past few years, the retailers Bunnings, Briscoes and Rebel 
Sports have been in the union’s ‘firing line’. A key recent issue has been the protection of 
employees’ ‘contracted hours’ at retailers such as Countdown, and opposing 90-day 
probationary clauses and reduced youth wages (FIRST Union, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
Quite differently, the SDA relies heavily on developing good relationships with senior HR 
managers, and will not engage in bargaining without firm agreement from the organisations 
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with which they are negotiating (SDA state official, 2011). Collective bargaining with 
national retail chains is carried out by senior national SDA officials, including the National 
Secretary. Where companies are state-based, state union leaders undertake bargaining. 
Further, the SDA’s bargaining tactics generally do not rely on recruiting widely in the first 
instance. Indeed, a ‘bargain first, recruit later’ strategy is generally adopted, and a negotiated 
agreement is then ‘rolled out’ in the company as a recruiting tool. As a State official (2011) 
described in the context of Coles: 
We really do try to make the most of these roll-outs. I’m very disappointed that we’ve [only] 
signed up 330 people in Coles over the roll-out period. That for us is under-performance. 
 Furthermore, gaining a first agreement may take considerable time. Only after several years 
of effort did the SDA recently sign its first agreement with the European retailer Aldi 
(Workplace Express, 2013). A long-serving official argued that collective bargaining ‘created 
a strengthening of relationships and … really opened or educated a lot of companies that they 
need to be involved’ (SDA State official, 2009).  
 
As noted, FIRST Union bargains much more aggressively than the SDA. Distinctive 
‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1995) – various protest-related tools and actions available 
to a movement or organisation – are a notable part of FIRST Union’s strategy, and choosing 
highly visible retail store targets is a favoured tactic. As a FIRST Union national official 
(2011) explained, 
Always the ones on the road to the airport ... I put a lot of resources into those shops because 
they’re high publicity. Every MP is going up and down the bloody country every day, going up 
and down ... it’s easy to get on the news. 
Indicative of the conflictual employment relations in retail, the union was also involved, 
along with the Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union, in the high profile 2006 
Progressive Enterprises dispute. Union members in the company’s distribution centres were 
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locked out after strike action. A bruising experience for both sides, the dispute contributed to 
a considerable loss of market share for the company, a situation from which it is now only 
just recovering. Five target shops were identified in this dispute. These shops had to be on 
main roads or ‘if it had to be in a mall, it had to be a mall that had good street frontage that 
was close by where the supermarket was’ (FIRST Union national official, 2011). Another 
related, contentious strategy was used in respect to the department store, Farmers: 
Farmers … have been the promoters of the Christmas Parade forever; and on one of their 
shops downtown they have a big Santa that used to blink and used to have a rather 
naughty finger. So we were in bargaining with them; and we held a ‘Skinny Santa’ 
parade the week before the Christmas parade ... and we bussed Farmers workers in from 
all over the place ... That was a lot of fun. (FIRST Union national official, 2011) 
Strategies continue to be ‘in your face’, with a recent dispute involving Pak’n'Save 
stores involving poverty groups, shopping centre car park banners referring to 
‘Pak’n’Slaves’ and the regular outing of a large blow-up Rat (FIRST Union, 2103b). 
  
To speak of ‘repertoires of contention’ with respect to the SDA is a non sequitur. The SDA 
shuns militancy, confrontational behaviour and indeed media attention.  In sum, FIRST 
Union is a ‘campaigning’ union that bargains, whereas the SDA is a bargaining union that 
rarely campaigns – at least in the adversarial sense of the NZ union.  
 
Relationships with employers 
The discussion of bargaining and campaigning indicates that the two unions have very 
different approaches to employers. FIRST Union, consistent with its militant approach and 
left-of-centre frame that emphasises struggle, is tentative about developing good relationships 
with employers and is wary of their implications. An exception illustrates the rule. The 
13 
 
debilitating Progressive dispute mentioned above (Progressive is owned by the Australian 
company Woolworths) led to conscious decisions by both the employer and FIRST Union to 
develop a less conflictual relationship, although FIRST Union still exhibits antagonistic 
dealings with other employers. A FIRST National official invoked the metaphor of ‘boxing 
and dancing’ (Huzzard, Gregory and Scott, 2004) to describe her ambivalence about a more 
cooperative relationship with Progressive Enterprises: 
Our members are loving it ... but sometimes it feels a bit too close for comfort ... [but] 
our members interests are best served with us dancing with Progressive ... From time to 
time, we’re sometimes standing on each other’s toes, but it’s come out of having given 
each other a bloody nose. 
 
For the SDA, good relationships with employers are the norm. The importance of 
relationships with state and national HR managers with respect to bargaining cascades down 
to the store level:  
Our good organisers will have good relationships with managers, to the point where 
often, a manager will ring the union, and say, ‘I’ve got a problem with such and such an 
employee. What do I do about it?’ And the organiser will often assist the manager in 
dealing with the employee, and maybe even talk to the employee that they need to do this 
differently, or that better, or whatever. (SDA national official, 2011) 
 
Both unions service their members, but FIRST Union places more reliance on delegates to 
provide a ‘first line’ of servicing than does the SDA. As one organiser put it, ‘I say to 
[members at] a site, ‘You and your delegate are the key. You can get answers, you can get 
problems resolved, whereas I’m out and about doing what I need to do’’ (FIRST Union 
regional organiser, 2011). 
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As has been argued elsewhere (Price et al., 2014), the SDA has developed with many major 
Australian retailers sets of collaborative relationships that are relatively more stable and 
enduring – although more low-key – than the more ambitious and legislatively supported 
forms of partnership found in countries such as the UK (e.g., Brown and Oxenbridge, 2004). 
Collaboration, SDA-style, is built on interpersonal connections between union officials, 
organisers and company managers, which strongly underpin the union’s approach to 
bargaining and to servicing, as described above. In contrast, FIRST Union is reluctant to 
engage in such relationships. For the SDA, good relationships with employers are a strategic 
achievement; for FIRST Union, they are largely seen as a liability. 
 
Ideology 
A key theme that arose from the interviews was the stark contrast in the politics of the unions. 
The SDA has its origins in Australia’s strong Irish, working-class history, and is aligned with 
the right wing of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (McCann, 1994; Warhurst, 2008), 
including the Catholic ‘Groupers’ of the 1950s who were part of a major push against 
Communist influence in the labour movement. The broader context of this is the influence of 
ALP factions which, as Leigh (2000: 427) argues, are ‘more structured than … any other 
social democratic party in the Western world’. Unions are integral to these factions. The SDA 
continues to lobby parliamentarians to adopt conservative positions on conscience votes 
regarding issues such as abortion and gay marriage (Warhurst, 2008). The publicity 
associated with the recent election of the former West Australian SDA Secretary to Federal 
parliament highlighted some of the tensions inherent in the SDA’s conservative social stance; 
in this case, related to the SDA’s position with respect to sexual diversity (Burrell, 2014). The 
SDA exerts political influence in various ways: as a large voting bloc within both the ALP 
and in union peak bodies such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), and via 
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ex-SDA officials who enter parliament – like the former WA Secretary. As part of this bloc, 
the ACTU, whose largest affiliate is the SDA, played a remarkable role in the 2005–2007 
Your Rights at Work campaign against IR legislation passed by an earlier, highly neo-liberal 
government. This involved a major centralised media campaign to gain support – and votes 
for the ALP – from non-unionists as well as union members (Muir, 2008), involving a 
reframing of the IR debate at the time and leading to a change of government and a re-
emphasis on collective bargaining. In similar fashion, the SDA has exerted influence over IR 
reforms put in place by the 2007-2012 ALP government, particularly the Fair Work Act 2009. 
In short, the SDA has long been known for its moderate ‘business unionism’ approach 
(McCann, 1994; Game and Pringle, 1983) which, as this research shows, continues to this 
day. Recruitment and servicing were recurring themes for SDA officials: 
We do put a big emphasis on recruitment; it’s something that keeps us strong, makes sure we 
grow, we’re out there obviously, people are protected, all of that. So that is a big focus for us, 
but the servicing part is also … it’s hard to say that it is 50/50, I would say probably 
recruitment is the bigger focus, but at the same time servicing can’t slip because of that (SDA 
state organiser, 2011). 
The sentiments in the following quote about the conservative, non-militant nature of the SDA 
membership were echoed many times in interviews with officials: 
… bargaining power is very much dependent upon having a decent presence in the first 
place ... well, I don’t think anyone would accuse us as being militant. We get criticised 
by that in some circles. I don’t really care. I don’t think our members particularly want 
militancy. I don’t think 17 year old people who … sign up to become members of the 
SDA particularly want to be going out on a strike six months later. (SDA state secretary, 
2011) 
A major aspect of the union’s strategy is to maintain a bargaining regime favourable to its 
members via legislation when the ALP is in power.  
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In contrast, FIRST Union leaders’ political affiliations tend toward the socialist Left, with 
some ex-officials having previously held parliamentary positions and exerted significant 
influence over the public policy agenda. But it is not affiliated with the Labour Party. 
Moreover, the union’s campaigning history, which we discussed above, indicates that this 
union is willing to ‘upset’ employers, very much in contrast to the SDA. In addition, there is 
robust divergence of opinion in FIRST Union between more senior officials and organisers, 
with senior officials taking a left-of-centre political and campaigning stance, yet with some 
organisers openly critical what they see as the union’s insufficiently militant approach. A 
younger organiser was critical of FIRST Union’s strategy and resource deployment, 
parodying the union’s own self-identification and observing with irony: 
We are a struggle-based union, not an organising union: we’re struggling to be a union. Oh 
no, that’s not right! 
While this range of views creates tensions, overall the differences of opinions and approaches 
are seen as a source of strength rather than disunity, and staff are open about discussing them. 
The small union UNITE, set up some years ago – by a team which included the current 
FIRST Union retail secretary – as a ‘ginger group’ union to represent low-paid workers 
(particularly in fast food and hospitality but potentially extending into retail) provides an 
alternative viewpoint that challenges the stance of mainstream unions like FIRST and is a 
potential rival should FIRST Union’s members be unhappy with their union. 
 
Outcomes 
However, IR outcomes indicate that, despite a range of innovative strategies in NZ, the 
superior institutional arrangements in Australia provide better coverage for retail employees. 
In Australia, collective agreements apply to 43 per cent of the whole workforce, and 37 per 
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cent of retail (Peetz and Price, 2007; Blumenfeld et al., 2011), while in NZ, overall collective 
bargaining coverage is only 13 per cent and, despite the efforts of FIRST Union, retail has a 
mere five per cent (Blumenfeld et al., 2011). Minimum wages in the sector also differ. In NZ, 
in 2011, the minimum adult rate in food retail was $NZ554, about six per cent above the then 
statutory minimum wage (Blumenfeld et al., 2011: 30). Australia’s minimum wage in retail 
and the floor for collective bargaining in the industry, as set out in the General Retail Award, 
is currently $AU666.10 – around 10 per cent above the minimum wage. Thus, the legislative 
environment and the ‘floor’ of working conditions in Australia are key elements of employee 
protection. 
 
As noted, the unions differ in size. In a positive vein, the NZ union has managed to reverse 
haemorrhaging retail union membership, increasing it (albeit from a low base) by more than 
70 per cent (from 6,800 to 12,000) over the six years 2007–13 (FIRST Union, 2014); an 
outcome that reflects a more rigorous approach to campaigning and intensive recruitment in 
preparation for bargaining. 
 
A common theme in both unions – as is the case world-wide (e.g. Parker and Rees, 2013) –
was the importance of recruiting. High employee turnover in retail means that ‘recruiting 
simply to stand still’ is a priority in both countries. Indeed, in Australia, the SDA needs to 
sign up 70,000 retail employees annually, or around 30 per cent of its membership, simply to 
maintain aggregate membership (Lynch et al., 2011). 
 
Analysis of Union Power in Retail: A Cross-Tasman Comparison 
In this section, we outline some general analytical points. We draw first on concepts from 
Levesque and Murray (2012), making four key points: 1) FIRST Union has many fewer 
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infrastructural resources than the SDA, but a greater willingness to use what it has; 2) the 
SDA has high network embeddedness in political terms, but FIRST has a greater tendency to 
align with progressive social causes; 3) FIRST has higher internal solidarity than the SDA; 4) 
FIRST union has more varied narrative resources than the SDA. We then turn to a larger 
analysis of the two unions’ environments guided by Kelly (2011). Our overall argument is 
that the contrast in the two unions’ modus operandi is usefully unpacked using Levesque and 
Murray’s (2012) framework, but that Kelly’s (2011) model highlights the critical factors that 
are responsible for successful outcomes. In particular, we argue that union ideology is a 
neglected issue in much of the literature on union revitalisation. The value of the comparative 
approach used is that: first, we are able via our choice of cases to control for markets and the 
labour process, which are similar in both countries; second, we are able, using Levesque and 
Murray, to compare and contrast how union resources are used. Thirdly, we return to Kelly 
(2011) to highlight the way in which IR institutions ultimately shape outcomes. 
 
With respect to the effects of markets (labour and product) and the labour process, there is 
little to distinguish the two unions’ environments. The only notable contrast is that FIRST 
Union, with coverage of transport employees, has control of the entire supply chain, which 
increases its bargaining leverage and therefore power in relation to employers.  
Resources and their Mobilisation 
With respect to resources, the SDA has much larger infrastructural resources than FIRST 
Union, notably sheer membership size, which increases the union’s internal resources and 
bolsters its institutional security. Even with a mere 23 per cent density in its largest 
stronghold of supermarkets, and the challenges of ‘recruiting to stand still’, the SDA is 
Australia’s largest union. In contrast, FIRST Union is literally a ‘union on the edge’ in a 
small country. The SDA does not, however, generally mobilise its large infrastructural 
19 
 
resources, in contrast to targeted FIRST Union campaigns that involve industrial action, 
mobilisation of public opinion and attacks on retail brands. In other words, the SDA does not 
in general use the strategic capabilities that come from size. We expand below on these 
issues. 
 
Network embeddedness 
Network embeddedness differs in scope and type between the two unions, with the Australian 
union having considerable power as a result of its political relationships. Both countries are 
currently under conservative governments; NZ in the second term of such a government 
which gained power in 2008 and is poised to take office a third time; and Australia early in 
the first term of a conservative government elected in 2012. The second term of NZ’s 
conservative government is now exacerbating the difficulties for FIRST Union in deploying 
its limited resources. While political forces may deplete the institutional supports of NZ 
unions in the near future, including those for ‘good faith bargaining’ (Department of Labour 
[NZ], 2013; Parker, Nemani, Arrowsmith and Bhowmick, 2012), this may lead to further 
mobilisation, given the capacity of FIRST Union to deploy a variety of collective action 
frames. Given its newness, the Australian conservative government has not had sufficient 
opportunity to implement IR changes, and is in any case wary of wholesale amendments 
given IR changes are a key element of why it lost power in 2007 (Muir, 2012). However, it 
may well be that its second term sees a focus on IR change. In addition, in Australia, the ALP 
government (2007-2012) strengthened collective bargaining provisions and largely retained 
awards, which to some extent gives the Australian labour movement some capacity to 
withstand further changes. 
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In terms of cultural and social links, FIRST Union enhances its network embeddedness with 
race-based organising approaches to Māori and Pacific Island employees, while the SDA’s 
civil society links focus on conservative associations linked to the Catholic Church such as 
the Australian Family Association. Thus, FIRST Union’s network embeddedness with respect 
to social movements is linked to more ‘progressive’ causes based on race and class, whereas 
the SDA’s has traction via conservative religious bodies and thus only with a small 
proportion of the population. However, the SDA’s political embeddedness, while naturally 
attenuated during periods of non-ALP government such as at the present, holds back the tide 
of IR legislative change. 
 
Internal solidarity and narrative resources 
Following on from the discussion of ideology and apparent in the distinctive bargaining and 
campaigning strategies of the two unions, both internal solidarity and narrative resources are 
higher in FIRST Union than in the SDA. Clearly, FIRST Union has a strongly militant, 
campaigning, ‘struggle-based’ approach. This is partly as a result of its ideology, which 
might be called a ‘varieties of Marxism’ approach focused on social justice for employees, 
and partly as a result of history. FIRST Union has a set of collective action frames and a 
coherent narrative that develops collective identities by mobilising shared senses of 
grievances amongst employees. Notably, it mostly concludes one-year agreements with 
employers. While a resource-intensive strategy, this gives the union a reason, indeed an 
imperative, for being in workplaces in a more intensively ‘organised’ way than the SDA. 
FIRST Union’s framing of its narrative resources allows union militants to challenge 
hegemonic ideas (in the sense of Lukes’ [2005] ‘third dimension’ of power) and to pursue 
strategies that rely on mobilising members’ sense of injustice. As noted by social movement 
theorists, pursuing new repertoires of contention can in turn shape collective frames of 
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references that lead to enlarged repertoires (Tarrow, 2011) and thus lead to a ‘virtuous path’ 
of finding common cause and thus a shared political frame between leaders, activists and 
members (Upchurch, Croucher and Flynn, 2012: 865). 
 
In contrast, the collective action frame of the SDA privileges patient and persistent advances, 
based on a ‘bread and butter’ discourse of maintaining members’ pay and conditions (see 
Levesque and Murray, 2012). This discourse draws on official and organiser agency, but to a 
much lesser extent than FIRST Union on member agency, thus diminishing internal 
solidarity. The SDA’s ‘bargain first, recruit later’ strategy, while appearing counter-intuitive, 
makes sense within the context of Australia’s IR laws and their relatively high support for 
(decentralised) collective bargaining, reducing ‘risk’ for the union. However, this strategy de-
emphasises member agency at the workplace level and means that explicit class-based 
narratives are not deployed. 
 
The Ideological Dimensions of Retail Union Power 
At one level, the SDA’s approach is consistent with arguments (e.g., Heery, 2009) that the 
particular problems of contingent and low-paid labour require an ‘upscaling’ in union 
representation. Hence, the broader capacity of the Australian union movement, with a single 
and representative national peak union body, to engage in agenda-setting, articulating, 
learning and intermediating, helps unions such as the SDA in terms of advancing ‘bigger 
picture’ issues. Yet such a capacity shifts class-based struggles – to the extent that they exist 
in Australia’s neo-liberal social democracy – from the industrial to the political arena and 
reduces the need for ‘cultures of solidarity’ which, as recently demonstrated (Simms and 
Dean, 2014, citing Fantasia), can lead to the mobilisation of perceived ‘non militant’ groups. 
Further, ‘up-scaling’ means that when the ALP is in opposition, union political agency is 
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considerably weakened. Interestingly, both unions have largely rejected the ‘organising 
model’ but for very different reasons: for FIRST Union, this is mainly because of the model 
is depoliticised (see Simms, 2012), and for the SDA it is because grassroots activism would 
challenge strong centralised control of union strategy in which ‘recruiting to stand still’ and 
servicing by full-time staff are key. 
 
Both unions have some capacity to resist – via sheer numbers in the case of the SDA, strong 
density in certain strategic areas such as large supermarkets for both unions, and FIRST 
Union’s narrative resources and its willingness to deploy a varied repertoire of contention. 
But the key question is not ‘how much’ power a union has, but rather under what conditions 
capacity is likely to be activated and turned into collective action in some form (Kelly, 2011: 
22). The neo-liberal context provides major challenges for retail unions covering service 
employees, many of whom are in highly contingent work arrangements and have relatively 
weak labour market attachment. This is particularly so in NZ, where deregulation has been 
quicker and more radical than in Australia. In a small-scale setting like NZ, a ‘thinner’ 
regulatory framework (Parker, 2011) is felt more acutely. It is the institutional support for the 
employment relationship that is all-important, as illustrated by the much greater capacity of 
Australia’s laws – at the moment – to protect the low-paid, in contrast to NZ’s laws. 
However, both unions are weaker than their counterparts in most parts of Western Europe; 
evidenced, for example, by comparative bargaining densities (Kelly, 2011) which points to 
single-employer bargaining frameworks in Australia and NZ reducing union power. 
 
Conclusions 
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A suggestion for future academic inquiry is to obtain the views of members in relation to 
union strategy, as the two contrasting cases presented in this paper, like much of the literature 
on union strategy, does not take into account a member perspective.  
 
Framing our analysis with reference to Kelly (2011) and Levesque and Murray’s (2010) 
models of union power, this study has identified and reinforced the importance of 
institutional frameworks in shaping union strategy and power. We have also demonstrated 
that an explicit focus on union ideology enhances scholars’ understanding of union strategy, 
in line with Simms’ (2012) argument that this dimension is key (but ignored by dominant 
union approaches to organising and by much of the literature on union strategy and power). 
Returning to Figure 1, ideology clearly shapes unions’ power resources and its capabilities 
(when and how it activates resources). This insight contributes to the theoretical literature on 
union power by emphasising that conceptual models need to explicitly consider union 
ideology. 
 
Following its ideological leanings, FIRST Union uses more aggressive strategies (e.g., via 
workplace organising arrangements and bargaining tactics) than the SDA. The SDA’s more 
conciliatory approach takes place in the Australian insitutional setting, which has taken a less 
radical deregulatory path than NZ’s. However, despite the well-articulated, strongly militant, 
struggle-based, mobilising frame, the NZ union labours for traction in a highly unfavourable 
neo-liberal IR regime which has fostered anti-union strategies on the part of employers post-
ECA. Likely changes to the Employment Relations Act 2000, including around the duty of 
good faith not requiring a collective agreement to be concluded, may well intensify this 
imbalance. In a relatively more benign – for the moment – IR environment in Australia, a 
prototypical ‘business unionism’ approach appears to serve the institutional interests of the 
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Australian union in its specific context, but at the expense of mobilisational capacity, 
solidarity and employee voice, limiting the union’s power resources and strategic capabilities 
in the longer term. 
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